Editorial Introduction by Crook, Richard
1 Introduction: Law and
Development
The articles in this issue of the Bulletin are the
product of an international workshop held at IDS
in June 2000, which brought together a multi-
disciplinary group of scholars - lawyers, political
scientists, anthropologists and sociologists - with
development practitioners and legal reformers.'
Our purpose was to examine the 'state of the art' in
current thinking about law and development,
focusing particularly on how the law and legal
institutions affect the lives of ordinary citizens,
particularly the poor and disadvantaged. It was
hoped also that a new set of research agendas could
be developed which would be relevant to the issues
facing low- and middle-income (LMIs) countries in
the first decade of the 2 ist century The results
more than met our expectations in that the articles
presented here are representative of a stimulating
set of discussions which covered an enormously
wide range of evolving debates, from the nature of
law itself, human rights and globalisation on the
one hand, to crucial issues such as the protection of
land and property rights, access to justice, the
conditions of political or collective action,
democratic legal reform and the regulation of
international business, on the other.
What accounts for the renewed interest in the role
of law in development? After a hiatus between the
mid-l970 and the mid-1980s, law has re-emerged
onto the international development agenda. A
number of reasons may be suggested:
First, the 'good governance' policies advocated
by the international donor community,
following the failure of the structural
adjustment programmes of the 1980s, see
reform of the state and its relations with society
as key elements in promoting market-led
growth. The 'rule of law' and legal reform,
according to this agenda, are an essential
element for creating an 'enabling environment',
insofar as they can ensure the enforcement of
contracts and the security of private property
Second, insofar as good governance means
more accountable and transparent government,
more legitimate and effective legal institutions
are needed to protect citizens' rights, limit the
actions of corrupt or oppressive state officials
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and protect the livelihoods of the poor and
excluded. The need to make legal, regulatory
and judicial institutions more effective in these
latter roles has become even more pressing as a
result of the fragmenting and destabilising
effects of global marketisation.
Third, in spite of the diversity of the huge
number of new democracies (some nominal at
best) which have emerged since the 1980s, there
is a new concern with the legally defined
concept of 'citizenship', seen as a crucial and
common requisite for the operation of any
effective democracy (Collier and Levitsky 1997;
O'Donnell 2000).
Fourth, rising levels of crime, civil disorder and
violence in the burgeoning urban metropoles of
the developing world, and the exacerbation of
political conflict in many new democracies, have
put questions of policing, access to justice and
judicial reform near the top of many national
agendas. Again, the poor and disadvantaged are
often the most severely affected by this lack of
security in their everyday lives (World Bank
2000).
2 Concepts of the Law and Legal
Processes
Within the context of this renewed interest in law,
the intention of the workshop was to go beyond the
concern with law as an enabling framework for
commerce and investment and to refocus on how
legal processes and legal institutions affect people in
their everyday lives. Both the content and the
administration of land law, family law, labour law
and negligence, for instance, impact on the security
with which poor people can hold and use assets
such as land or natural resources, obtain a fair
return for their labour, or develop small business
opportunities. A corrupt and ineffective criminal
justice system (including policing) can have a
deeply detrimental effect on the security of
everyday life and on citizens' protection from
arbitrary state action.2 In short, not only is the legal
system an aspect of power relations amongst
(unequal) individuals and groups, it can shape how
people make economic decisions, and how they
invest their social capital in organisations or in
political action.
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One currently dominant approach to these issues is
to conceptualise the problem as one of 'access to
justice' It is argued that what vulnerable citizens
most need is access to more effective and affordable
legal remedies, administered in an honest and
efficient manner through 'due process'; only in this
way can they establish their rights and enforce those
rights even against the state itself. The 'rule of law'
is, after all, fundamentally about making the state
itself subject to its own rules.
One problem with this 'rights-based' approach,
however, is its rather narrow view of the law as a
'service', offering formal legal remedies through
litigation or the threat of litigation. The assumption
is that law, like education or health, must be
available to the largest percentage of the population;
if it is not, then there is a situation of unjust
exclusion. Yet even in the most effective and
accessible systems, litigation is almost by definition
the remedy of a tiny minority of the population and
therefore excludes the poor. Attempts to use
justiciable rights' in support of poverty-reduction
campaigns in India, for instance, may make good
politics but are leading to a backlog of cases of
Dickensian proportions before the Supreme Court.4
Recognising the practical impossibility of making
litigation in the courts literally available to all, many
legal reform advocates and development agencies
are putting a new emphasis on 'alternative dispute
resolution' mechanisms (ADRs).5 One strand of this
approach (much developed in the 'informal' urban
areas of Latin America) aims to develop
community-based forms of mediation and
arbitration that avoid the expense and uncertainty
of adversarial contests in state courts. Another
strand is fascinated with the idea of supporting - or
in some cases reviving - 'customary' and
'traditional' forms of legal regulation, which are
seen as more popular, more locally based, better
understood by ordinary people and more
concerned with restitution and mutually agreed
dispute settlement. This idea has developed furthest
in the African, South and South-East Asian
contexts.
The ADR movement shares with the legal pluralists
the view that the pursuit of a more popular and
accessible judicial system probably cannot confine
itself to state law; there are other institutionalised
regulatory orders which can perform the same
function, perhaps more effectively Yet, like the
access to justice approach, the ADR focus on 'law as
dispute resolution', or the resolution of law-
breaking, is still too narrow. As Nader argues in this
issue, dispute resolution can only be truly
consensual if relations of power between the parties
are relatively equal. Otherwise the powerful tend to
win. It is naive, to say the least, to assume that
community leaders dispensing justice in an urban
'squatter settlement' have less assymetrical power
relations with the parties or are more 'accountable'
than state courts. And these considerations are
equally true of customary law systems, which have
been, and continue to be, reinvented through the
colonial and post-colonial periods in response to
changes in the configuration of local economic and
political power structures.
If this reality is recognised, it is also apparent that
another danger of the ADR and local law
approaches is that they may simply give more
power to local élites to act arbitrarily Historically,
the formal equality given to litigants by the judicial
institutions of a central state has often protected the
weak against local tyrannies.
Law in its broadest sense is, therefore, more than
dispute resolution; whether embedded in state or
non-state institutions, it permeates everyday lives
insofar as it is about the power to enforce or regulate
social relationships. One of the classic
anthropological definitions views law as those rules
of 'role relationships and obligations' which are
capable of being sanctioned or enforced by 'publicly
acknowledged authority' (Radcliffe Brown 1952;
Pospisil 1971). Law implies power and authority
and hence unequal relationships. And whether one
attributes the quality of 'law' to non-state regulatory
orders or not, it is clear that in empirical terms, the
modern state is a primary source of the most
dominant regulatory order, since the vast majority of
contemporary societies exist within a state-bounded
polity It is a characteristic of the modern state that
law or the legal system is a highly differentiated
sphere of state action, enjoying a monopoly of both
the symbolic authority of the state and its threat of
coercive enforcement. The law - and hence the state
- is present at every point where the myriad
relationships amongst individuals, families and
groups in a complex economy are enforced,
3
regulated, defined or facilitated, from marriage and
sexual behaviour through to economic exchange,
the disposal of property and the power to command
the services of others.7 The state determines which
classes of interests are worthy of its support. In
aggregate terms, the state enforces particular systems
of stratification and economic distribution;
sustaining the market (through law) is, of course,
one such distributional mechanism. As Edelman
puts it, law becomes a prize, 'a site and a stake of
class struggle' (Edelman 1979).
If one is interested in how legal processes and
institutions impact on people's everyday lives, it is
clear, therefore, that the most salient and frequently
experienced points of contact are not, in the first
instance, the courts but state regulatory,
administrative and quasi-judicial institutions.
Particularly in the agricultural economies typical of
many developing countries, these institutions are
involved, for instance, in land use and allocation,
including the regulation of produce marketing;
more generally, quasi-judicial roles are performed
through the issuing of permissions and benefits, the
regulation of employment and employment status
(including the crucial matter of residency status in
the migrant-dominated economies of Africa) and
control of access to political rights through the
regulation and administration of elections and
associational life. It is through these operations of
the state that people experience 'law as practice' -
the relationships and behaviours that are actually
practiced and enforced in those realms where the
stat&s writ runs. Whether they are perceived as
legitimate and acceptable is another matter, a highly
political matter, particularly if there are other,
competing regulatory orders, which are regarded as
more acceptable and are more 'practised' than
those of the state.
3 Main Themes
The articles which follow are grouped according to
the three major themes that emerged from the
discussions at the workshop.
3.1 The nature of law, and legal pluralism
At the most general level was the debate over the
nature and significance of law itself, or, as
Houtzager puts it, 'how much does law really
matter?' His perspective on law as a politically
determined resource, which is shaped and
interpreted through the interactions between state
power and collective action, is shared by other
contributors such as Nader and Benda-Beckmann
who are equally concerned with law as the
embodiment of power relations. Historically, law,
not least in colonial states, has been both
empowering and disempowering, an instrument
both of state oppression and of liberation. Although
recognising that legal categories can shape social
and political identities, all would reject the
instrumentalist view of law as the tool of social
engineering, which can determine behaviour in a
linear manner. Woodman, indeed, sees law as
essentially any set of 'observed social norms', i.e. it
must be practised as a social fact, and therefore
follows rather than determines social relationships.
The debate over legal pluralism is also continued
within this collection; given that a plurality of
regulatory orders is a particularly prevalent feature
of ex-colonial countries, the question of the
relationship between state and non-state law
remains a live one. Disagreement over whether to
call non-state regulatory orders 'law' is not just
semantic; it signals a difference of analytical
perspective and also an empirical judgement.
Houtzager and Crook both argue for the primacy of
state or national law as the most generally
authoritative and enforceable normative order,
perhaps because they are particularly concerned
with the role of law as an embodiment of power
relations within a national economic and political
system. Woodman, on the other hand, argues that
state law has 'no distinctive characteristics', in order
to support his plea for customary law to be
acknowledged as a living force, a deeply embedded
set of rules which are 'clearer, better known and
more acceptable' to the mass of the population than
state law Such an approach, as he acknowledges,
leaves advocates for the rule of law with the
intractable problem of the multiplicity and local
character of customary laws.
The anthropological approach is represented in
Benda-Beckmann's suggestion that legal pluralism is
simply an acknowledgement of the theoretical
possibility of more than one legal order; ït does not
imply any normative or political preference for non-
state over state law. What matters, he argues, is to
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analyse law by its properties or functions, which are
everywhere concerned with defining who has the
right to exercise control over people and resources.
lt is essentially an empirical question to determine
what the actual impact of a particular order is on
the distribution of power and resources. (One
might observe that the state would undoubtedly
have to be acknowledged as empirically critical in
such a political conceptualisation of law.)
At the other extreme lies Baxi, who attacks the
contemporary globalisation of rule-of-law and
human-rights discourses as a simple continuation
of what the law of the bourgeois state has always
done: make the world safe for capital and its
interests, thus trampling on all other alternative
moral orders.
3.2 Protecting land and property rights:
state power and local responses
A second major theme to emerge from the
workshop was the concern with the role of law
and legal systems in the protection of poor
people's ability to hold and exploit land and
natural resources. Once again the existence of a
plurality of regulatory orders appeared as central
to the issue of how best to offer legitimate and
effective protection against expropriation by the
more powerful (including the state), as well as
certainty and security where title is constantly in
dispute. The latter issues clearly vary in salience
according to the degree of competition and
scarcity In situations of extreme competition,
where there has been extensive marketisation of
land and large migrations of labour, as in the cash
crop areas of West Africa, or in the squatter areas
of large cities such as Karachi or Nairobi, there is
a constant struggle for possession and protection
against loss.
Crook argues, on the basis of a comparison of the
different trajectories of the cocoa-growing
economies of Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire, that a
multiplicity of regulatory orders managed by local
communities can only offer protection in such
situations to the extent that they are 'legalised', i.e.
incorporated into the formal legal system and
sustained by the state. Where rights over land were
built on relations of social bargaining, and
competition of normative orders led to lack of
authority and enforceability as in Cote d'ivoire,
then customary forms of law were unable to protect
indigenous communities either from incoming
migrants or from the state itself. But this is not to
argue that a strong state is always a blessing, as the
cases of Indonesia, Pakistan or South Africa
demonstrate. Benda-Beckmann reminds us how the
state in these countries used law to expropriate
indigenous land and natural resource rights, and in
the urban agglomerations of Pakistan or South
Africa the urban poor have lived or continue to live
in a state of illegality which leaves them
permanently vulnerable to arbitrary action by state
agents and the socially powerful. Even in Ghana,
the reformed Land Commission is, according to
Kasanga, operating as an agent of central state
patronage, leading to the clientelisation of public
and urban land allocation. But, echoing both Crook
and Woodman, he notes that the embeddedness
and strength of the social forces supporting
'customary' (legalised) land rights is sufficient to
support a demand that land administration be
returned to local communities and 'traditional'
authorities.
3.3 Legal institutions, legal reform and
access to justice
The third group of articles reflects the importance
in the new law and development agenda of issues
relating to legal processes, the reform of legal and
judicial institutions, and law reform itself. Both in
Brazil and South Africa, recently established
democracies are grappling with the problem of how
to establish greater observance of civic rights within
state administrative and criminal justice agencies,
and to develop the capacity of the judicial system to
hold these agencies more accountable for their
behaviour - classic rule-of-law concerns. Schärf
analyses the reasons for the limited achievements of
new community-policing initiatives in South Africa;
the police have been forced to become more
accountable to local communities, and more law-
abiding, but the pressures of the urban crime wave,
and their own internal organisational crises have
caused them to relapse into more traditional modes
of policing. The sheer scale of the economic
deprivation and political fragmentation afflicting
poor urban communities in post-apartheid South
Africa has also - as with the land issue - produced
violent conflict and a rise in vigilantism which the
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state seems unwilling or unable to control. Like our
other contributors, Scharf sees the only solution as
lying in the overall commitment to reform of the
political regime.
In Brazil, Sadek traces how new legal collective and
individual rights embodied in the 1988
Constitution, when combined with new legal
institutions and procedures such as public civil
actions and the Office of the Public Prosecutor, have
had a real impact on distributive justice and on
pursuing political corruption. One reason for their
success has been the supporting pressure generated
by newly mobilised civil society associations. But
the reforms could be blunted by restrictions
proposed by political élites at the highest level (the
presidency) who feel threatened by the Prosecutor's
powers.
Finally, both Newell and Baxi draw our attention to
the international and global dimensions. The
contradictions between the global level of
organisation adopted by multinational companies
(MNCs) and the limited reach of national forms of
regulation have evoked calls for reforms in the laws
governing legal standing (who may sue) and a
strengthening of the legal or quasi-legal
mechanisms through which MNCs can be made
more accountable for the social and environmental
impact of their activities. Newell is sceptical of the
ability of 'soft law' (informal or voluntary codes of
practice) to provide real protection for vulnerable
communities in developing countries, but stresses
that there is still a long way to go before
transnational litigation can overcome formidable
legal and institutional barriers. The general
agreement on the importance of political factors is
confirmed by Newell, who argues that community
political action is a crïtical element in any
restraining effect that a legal case might achieve.
3.4 Globalisation and human rights
The ideological character of globalisation as a
discourse facilitating the expansion of global
capitalism is highlighted by Baxi, who attacks the
arrogance of notions of development and the rule of
law based on economic rationalism and 'progress'.
In his view, the ability of world society to develop a
person-centred notion of human rights is being
threatened by a regressive global discourse which
he terms 'trade-related, market-friendly human
rights'. His challenge is a useful corrective to easy
assumptions about the inevitably progressive
character of the rule of law and 'rights-based'
approaches to development.
4 Conclusion
In conclusion, these articles point to a number of
important themes in the current debate on how to
develop more effective, accessible and legitimate
legal systems which will protect and enhance the
life chances of ordinary people across the
developing world. First, a deeper understanding of
the multiplicity of non-state regulatory orders and
their relationship to state law is required before we
go further into the realms of alternative dispute
resolution mechanisms and community-based law.
Second, whilst widening the scope of justiciable
rights may be seen as a way of enhancing the claims
of the poor, it must be remembered that the
enforceability and legitimacy of the outcomes of
legal action depend very much on the character of
the state and power structure within which they are
embedded. For this reason, it is important that
more research be undertaken on how legal
processes affect people in their everyday lives, and
in particular how these processes are experienced
and perceived by the subjects of those processes.
Third, only if these processes and perceptions are
better understood can more relevant policies for
reforming the most salient points of contact
between citizens and the state - local courts, police
and regulatory officials - be developed. The
effectiveness, fairness and legitimacy of such
institutions are of crucial importance in the lives of
the poor.
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Notes
The workshop was financed by grants from the IDS
Development Fund and from DFID (UK), to whom we
are extremely grateful. The views expressed in these
articles are, of course, the responsibility of the authors
alone. We should also like to thank all the participants
who attended the workshop, whose enthusiastic
contributions are represented in numerous ways in
the final collection of articles presented here. Special
thanks also to Professor Vanderlinden, who was
unable to attend but nevertheless ensured that he was
present 'in spirit' through his communications; and to
Mary McClymont of the Ford Foundation, who made
much useful material available to participants. A full
list of the participants in the workshop is available on
the IDS Governance website; http://www.ids.ac.uk/ids/
governlaccjustlrulawwkshp.html.
cf. Anderson (2000).
Department for International Development (2000).
It is thought that the backlog of cases could take 300
years to clear (Debroy 2000).
See Nader's article in this issue.
The only real challenge might come from counter-
state organisations such as criminal mafias, or guerrilla
forces, although these are unlikely to have 'legal-
rational' legitimacy Moore suggests the term
'reglementation' to refer to 'law-like' regulatory orders
which operate in non-state situations (Moore 1978)
cf. Poggi (1978); O'Donnell (1999).
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